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also advanced upon Charleroi, on the flanks of the 1st and 6th corps. The 4th corps was ordered to march upon the bridge of Chatelet.

On the approach of the French advanced guards an incessant skirmish was maintained during the whole morning with the Prussians, who, after losing many men, were compelled to yield to superior numbers. General Zieten, finding it impossible, from the extent of frontier he had to cover, to check the advance of the French, fell back towards Kleurs by the road to Charleroi, resolutely contesting the advance of the enemy wherever it was possible. In the repeated attacks sustained by him he suffered considerable loss. It was nearly mid-day before a passage through Charleroi was secured by the French army, and General Zieten continued his retreat upon Fleurus, where he took up his position for the night. Upon Zieten's abandoning, in the course of his retreat, the road which leads to Brussels through Quatre Bras, Marshal Ney, who had only just been put in command on the left of the French army, was ordered to advance by this road upon (vossclis, and found at Frasnes part of the Duke of Wellington's army, composed of Nassau troops under the command of Prince-Bernard of Saxe-Weimar, who, after some skirmishing, maintained his position. "Notwithstanding all the exertions of the French at a moment when time was of the greatest importance, they had only been able to advance about fifteen English miles during the day, with nearly fifteen hours of daylight."

It was the intention of Napoleon during his day to effect a separation between this English and Prussian armies, in which he had nearly succeeded. Napoleon's plan for this purpose, and the execution of it by his army, were alike admirable, but it is hardly probable that the Allied generals were taken by surprise, as it was the only

likely

course which Napoleon could have taken.* His line of operation-

¹ Captain Pringle,

² There was no doubt that the Allies were well stirred by

In Franco, and Clarke, so long War Minister of Napoleon, and now nominally lit th* same capacity with Louis XVIII. at Uhont, intuit hav* tarn* uWul, both from his own knowledge and from hi* maintfrnnitc** of lib romt«eti<m with the War Office; se© the note on information ciittiliifii liy him In /tort**/?/ ner, p. 26. *Vee al»o Muffling, p. 820, whnr« ht» a»y«